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COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN SOUND RECORDING:
HOW COURTS AND LEGISLATURES CAN GET IN
VOGUE IN A POST-CICCONE WORLD
Kristen B. Kennedy*
INTRODUCTION
From starving artists to superstars, the questions surrounding the
legality of sampling portions of other musicians’ creations are
manifold and complex, and the costs of guessing wrongly on their
answers can be astronomical.1 The legality of sampling has
depended for some time on what jurisdiction the inquiry took place
in, and has been guided by inconsistently applied doctrines of fair
use, de minimis, and copyright infringement.2 The Ninth Circuit’s
decision in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone in the summer of 2016 brought
these inconsistencies to the forefront.3

* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2019. Thank you to my husband, Joseph
Ammon, and my parents, Thomas and Debra Kennedy, for all your invaluable
support and encouragement. Special thanks to the staff of the Journal of Law and
Policy for all their comments and suggestions.
1
See Ryan Lloyd, Note, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing
Music Landscape, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 144 (2014); see also Charles
Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of
Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1244 (2015) (explaining that statutory
damages can “range between $750 and $300,000 . . . per work found to have been
infringed”). See generally Jeremy Mersereau, 10 Artists Who Were Sued for
Unauthorized Samples, AUX (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.aux.tv/2015/11/10artists-who-were-sued-for-unauthorized-samples/ (providing examples of
lawsuits over the unlicensed use of other artists’ work).
2
See Lloyd, supra note 1, at 155–62 (asserting that although some courts
have established a bright-line rule regarding musical sampling as copyright
infringement per se, others have declined to do so).
3
See VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
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On June 2, 2016, the Ninth Circuit held that the inclusion of a
.23-second sample horn hit in Madonna’s iconic 1990 song
“#ogue,” originally from the song “Love Break,” did not constitute
copyright infringement.4 This was a remarkable event in copyright
law because Ciccone represented the first occasion where a circuit
court had rejected the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line proclamation in
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films that musicians who use even
brief snippets from others’ musical creations must first obtain a
license to do so.5 For more than ten years, Bridgeport was the only
attempt by a circuit court to address the issue of whether the de
minimis defense, which rests on the principle that the law should not
bother with trifling matters, can successfully prevail against a
copyright infringement claim.6 With Ciccone, the Ninth Circuit
sharply rejected the Bridgeport standard by recognizing that a de
minimis defense could apply to samplings of sound recordings.7
Now that the Ninth Circuit has purposely created a circuit split,8 the
issue is ripe for a clarifying determination.9 Further complicating
matters is the question of whether fair use, defined as the reasonable,
relatively limited use of a protected work without its creator’s
permission, should act as an affirmative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement.10 The doctrines of fair use and de minimis
4

See id.
See Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02 (6th Cir.
2005); Lesley Grossberg, A Circuit Split at Last: Ninth Circuit Recognizes De
Minimis Exception to Copyright Infringement of Sound Recordings, BAKER
HOSTETLER: COPYRIGHT, CONTENT, & PLATFORMS (June 21, 2016),
https://www.copyrightcontentplatforms.com/2016/06/a-circuit-split-at-last-ninth
-circuit-recognizes-de-minimis-exception-to-copyright-infringement-of-soundrecordings/.
6
See Grossberg, supra note 5; De Minimis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
7
See Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 886–87.
8
See id. at 886.
9
See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court,
the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 (1998) (“Any case
involving a circuit split is a potential target for Supreme Court review, even if it
involves a mundane matter, because the inconsistency can be a problem in
itself.”).
10
Fair Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see Robert M.
Vrana, Note, The Remix Artist’s Catch-22: A Proposal for Compulsory Licensing
5
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have intersected in increasingly complicated ways with regards to
copyright infringement litigation,11 and a Supreme Court ruling
resolving the circuit split would restore predictability and clarity to
this area of the law.12
The unsettled application of these doctrines has far-reaching
implications: musicians are stifled by legal complexities, judges
lack a clear directive from the Supreme Court, and the advance of
streaming media has opened the door for ever-increasing amounts
of litigation in this field.13 In addition, there has been a recent
proliferation of copyright infringement claims against marquee
musicians like Robin Thicke, Justin Bieber, and Bruno Mars.14 The
Thicke case demonstrated the financial consequences of the
enormous unpredictability of copyright litigation.15 While the
for Transformative, Sampling-Based Music, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 817
(2011).
11
See generally NEIL WEINSTOCK, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 115 (1st ed.
2008) (describing the effect of copyright as arising from a complicated array of
copyright holder rights, sampling practices, and uncertainty about legal standing,
de minimis, and substantial similarity).
12
See Crystal M. Prais, Digital Music Sampling: The Fine Line Between
Infringement and Inspiration, N.J. L.J. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.
njlawjournal.com/id=1202768663677/Digital-Music-Sampling-The-Fine-LineBetween-Infringement-and-Inspiration?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL;
Herald, supra note 9, at 431.
13
See Vrana, supra note 10, at 812 (noting that the uncertain law has a
“chilling effect” on artists); Lloyd, supra note 1, at 163 (arguing that inconsistent
judgments have had a “negative effect on both the sampling artists and the
rightsholders.”).
14
See Complaint, Dienel v. Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp., No. 16978 (M.D. Tenn. filed May 25, 2016); Evan Minsker, Mark Ronson and Bruno
Mars Sued Over ‘Uptown Funk’, PITCHFORK (Oct. 29, 2016),
http://pitchfork.com/news/69413-mark-ronson-and-bruno-mars-sued-overuptown-funk/; Kory Grow, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Lose Multi-Million Dollar
‘Blurred
Lines’
Lawsuit,
ROLLING STONE
(Mar.
10,
2015),
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/robin-thicke-and-pharrell-loseblurred-lines-lawsuit-20150310. There is a significant distinction between cases
like the Bieber case, which includes an unauthorized sample, and the
Williams/Thicke case, which is essentially a case of copying the “look and feel”
of a song. This Note deals primarily with sampling music without a license, but
the Williams/Thicke case is still significant for its reverberations throughout the
industry.
15
See Grow, supra note 14.
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Bieber and Mars cases are unlikely to resolve the circuit split, they
serve as reminders of how badly a clarification in this area of
copyright law is needed in order to reduce the huge risks and high
costs typical of musical copyright litigation.16 The question then
becomes: what solutions exist to tackle the copyright problem,
which is ripe for a showdown at the Supreme Court after Ciccone?17
This note suggests a four-part solution to resolve the tensions in
copyrightable sound recordings magnified by the recent circuit split
that necessarily incorporates elements of de minimis and fair use, a
robust licensing scheme, and administrative oversight.18 This Note
proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of copyright
law and a historical primer on copyright infringement in the context
of digital music sampling, covering the major cases that have shaped
musical copyright infringement litigation into its current state. Part
II analyzes how the course nearly set by Bridgeport Music v.
Dimension Films stands to be corrected by VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone.
Part III proposes a four-part solution to the current challenges facing
courts, legislators, creators, and copyright owners in the context of
copyright infringement in sound recording. While Ciccone by no
means resolves the issues surrounding musical sampling and
16

Sound recording copyright infringement litigation may drag on for years.
See Lee Wilson, If You Want to Sue for Copyright Infringement, GRAPHIC
ARTISTS GUILD, https://graphicartistsguild.org/tools_resources/if-you-want-tosue (last visited May 25, 2017). Ciccone was first decided in 2013, and three years
passed before the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, CV 1205967 BRO, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184127 (C.D. Cal. 2013). The
Williams/Thicke case is still on appeal. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants-CrossAppellees, Williams v. Gaye, No. 13-06004 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016). See, e.g.,
https://consequenceofsound.net/2016/05/10-famous-instances-of-alleged-musicplagiarism/3/.
17
See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016);
Tamany Vinson Bentz & Matthew J. Busch, VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Madonna
Louise Ciccone, et al.: Why a Bright Line Infringement Rule for Sound Recordings
is no Longer in Vogue, VENABLE LLP (June 28, 2016),
https://www.venable.com/vmg-salsoul-llc-v-madonna-louise-ciccone-et-al-whya-bright-line-infringement-rule-for-sound-recordings-is-no-longer-in-vogue-0628-2016/.
18
See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C.L. REV. 1087, 1090
(2007) [hereinafter Carroll, Fixing Fair Use] (suggesting that the creation of a
Fair Use Board in the Copyright Office with authority to issue fair use rulings
would be an effective solution).
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copyright infringement, it does create an opportunity for a joint
legislative-judicial solution.
I. BACKGROUND: COPYRIGHT LAW AND MUSIC SAMPLING
A. Copyright Law
A basic tenet of American law is that the creator of an original
work has exclusive rights to any profits or proceeds derived from
that work for a certain length of time.19 The evolution of American
copyright law with respect to sound recording has followed the
principle that copyright holders alone have the right to perform the
work in public, or to license others to perform or otherwise make
use of the work.20 While this fits within the broader themes of
copyright law as it has evolved in the United States, copyright law
in sound recording has become considerably more complex over
time and has become the subject of much litigation and
governmental oversight.21 However, copyright infringement in
sound recordings does not necessarily have to be so unpredictable,
and this Note suggests several means by which legislatures and
courts could make the process more straightforward and less
litigious.

19

See A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited May 25, 2017).
20
See id.
21
Today the Copyright Office is a large administrative agency, registering
half a million claims to copyright per year. Id. Copyright cases are not only
numerous, but also time-consuming–data from 2005-2008 shows that the “the
median Commonplace copyright case took 37 days longer (a little over a month)
to terminate than the median comparable civil litigation suit.” Christopher A.
Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study of
Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 2011–12 (2014); see also Music
Copyright Infringement Resource, COLUMBIA L. SCH. & USC SCH. OF L.,
http://mcir.usc.edu/cases/Pages/ (last visited May 25, 2017) (“Since the 1850s
federal courts have published over 100 opinions dealing with this issue, but the
frequency with which these cases arise has increased markedly over the past
twenty years.”).
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1. The Copyright Act

The Copyright Act of 1790 (“the Act”) granted American
authors the exclusive right to print or publish their work for a
fourteen-year period, with the option to renew that right for another
fourteen years.22 The Act provided that Congress would have power
to “promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”23 This language was
modeled on the English Statute of Anne.24 The Act has been revised
several times since its first appearance, the most recent of these
being in 1976.25
The Act’s purpose was to give creators an incentive to create
original works by granting them total control over the use of their
works.26 Article I of the Act carried this out by providing protection
of the author’s creation from use by non-licensed parties for a set
period of time.27 This early support for the protection of creative
works was as grounded in philosophy as it was in practicality; the
Constitution sought to encourage creation as a matter of public
policy, and the Founders recognized that protecting the profits that
could be reaped from creation was one way to further that goal.28
Congress’s promotion of science and the arts was a way to ensure a
22

See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States,
ASS’N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486copyright-timeline#.WAJvaJMrLeQ (last visited May 25, 2017) [hereinafter
Copyright Timeline].
23
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24
See Wayne M. Cox, Note, Rhymin’ and Stealin’? The History of Sampling
in the Hip-Hop and Dance Music Worls and How U.S. Copyright Law & Judicial
Precedent Serves to Shackle Art, 14 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 219, 219 & n.2
(2015).
25
Copyright Timeline, supra note 22.
26
Id.
27
See Jimmy A. Frazier, Comment, On Moral Rights, Artist-Centered
Legislation, and the Role of the State in Art Worlds: Notes on Building a Sociology
of Copyright Law, 70 TUL. L. REV 313, 334 (1995).
28
See Vrana, supra note 10, at 815, n.20 (referring to EDWARD C.
WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 89–90 (2002), arguing this clause is unique
for providing both a purpose and a means of accomplishing that purpose).
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steadily growing quantity of original inventions and ideas.29
However, the Act was not viewed as a static endeavor; as times
changed, Congress was tasked with amending the Act to ensure it
adequately protected these fundamental interests.30
2. Revisions of the Act Over Time
In 1831, the first general revision of the Act brought music under
its protection,31 and for the first time, copyright owners of musical
works had the same rights and privileges as other copyright
holders.32 There were three major groups of interests in the musical
publishing landscape around the time of the 1831 revision—
composers, musical publishers, and the general public—each with
their own unique stake in the system.33 Composers received
protections for their works under the Copyright Act; publishers
bought copyrights from composers for either a one-time fee or
ongoing royalties; and the public, who listened to or performed the
musical works.34 The interplay of those interests continued to
dominate the conversation around copyright law for several
decades.35
Partially in response to an increasing number of interested
parties, the 1909 revision of the Act added the right to “arrange or
adapt,” and “subjected the right to control the creation and

29

Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient
Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and
Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 71–72 (1996).
30
See Sara K. Stalder, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 609, 633 (2006).
31
See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical
Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C.L. REV. 547, 558 (2006).
32
Marcy Rauer Wagman & Rachel Ellen Kopp, The Digital Revolution is
Being Downloaded: Why and How the Copyright Act Must Change to
Accommodate an Ever-Evolving Music Industry, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
271, 282–83 (2006).
33
Id. at 283.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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distribution of ‘mechanical’ copies to a compulsory license.”36
Furthermore, it enlarged the scope of protected categories of works
and extended the protection term to twenty-eight years.37 These
revisions reflected a series of changes in musical copyright, as the
rapid technological advances being made served to increasingly
complicate the position of copyright holders and non-holders
alike.38
The pace of revision of the Copyright Act slowed considerably
in comparison to the pace of innovation following the 1909
revisions, manifesting in just two significant events: the 1976
revision of the Act, and the 1998 passage of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The 1976 revision represented a
relatively major overhaul of the Act and was undertaken primarily
for two reasons: first, to determine the impact of technological
developments on copyright; and second, to bring the U.S. Code in
accord with international copyright law.39 Despite these
developments, the Act remains, to this day, essentially unchanged.40
While Congress does periodically make small-scale updates to the
Act,41 there are calls for a major revision to bring the Act further in
line with modern technology.42
36

Id. at 283–84. The purpose of these revisions was largely to balance the
rights of the composer and the rights of the public; ensuring public access in return
for appropriately compensating the composer. Copyright Timeline, supra note 22.
37
Copyright Timeline, supra note 22.
38
See id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7 [1909]
(“[I]t has been a serious and difficult task to combine the protection of the
composer with the protection of the public.”)).
39
Id.
40
Cox, supra note 24, at 219–20.
41
For two examples of relatively minor edits to the Act, see Copyright
Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No 111-295, 124
Stat. 3180 (2010) and Continuing Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-157,
124 Stat. 1116 (2010).
42
For example, Maria Pallante, from the Register of Copyrights for the
United States Copyright Office, appeared before the United States House of
Representatives to urge Congress to “think about the next great copyright
act . . . to ensure that the copyright law remains relevant and functional,” which
she notes “may require some bold adjustments to the general framework.”
Register of Copyrights United States Copyright Office before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet Comm. on the Judiciary, 2013 H.R.
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was signed into law on
October 28, 1998, bringing several major changes.43 It implemented
two treaties: the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty.44 It also addressed several critical copyrightrelated issues, including the liability of online service providers with
regards to music piracy.45 However, considering that this last major
update to the Copyright Act was nearly two decades ago, the need
for an update is self-evident.
3. The Fair Use Doctrine
The doctrine of fair use can be traced back to the 1710 Statute
of Anne, by which English courts proclaimed that “fair
abridgements” would not crowd the rights of authors.46 This remains
the core concept of fair use: if it does not hurt the creator or the
creator’s profit margin, use by another party is not prohibited.47
Some instances where the use of a copyright-protected work may be
deemed acceptable include news reporting, scholarship, criticism, or
research.48 The four factors used to determine whether the use of a
work falls under this distinction have not changed since their
113th Cong. 1st Sess. (2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante),
http://www.copyright.gov/regstat/2013/regstat03202013.html; Maria A. Pallante,
The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 320 (2013). At a
subsequent hearing, “five academics, attorneys and business professionals”
testified to lend their support to revision and reform efforts. Jonathan Randles,
Copyright Law Needs Update for Digital Age, Lawmakers Told, LAW360 (May
16, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/439732/copyright-law-needs-updatefor-digital-age-lawmakers-told.
43
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 U.S. Copyright Office
Summary, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca
.pdf (last visited May 25, 2017).
44
Id.
45
Id.; see also Cox, supra note 24, 219.
46
Denis T. Brogan, Note, Fair Use No Longer: How the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Bars Fair Use of Digitally Stored Copyrighted Works, 16 ST.
JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 691, 702 (2002).
47
More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
http://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html (last updated Apr. 2017).
48
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
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implementation: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market or value of the work.49
The doctrine of fair use permits the unlicensed use of copyrightprotected works under particular circumstances, mainly for the
purpose of encouraging freedom of expression.50 Fair use was
originally the creation of judges, but it is now codified in the most
recent update of the Copyright Act;51 judges today generally employ
it as a means of balancing the rights of authors and the First
Amendment rights of the public.52 Despite its ubiquity in copyright
law, fair use remains a somewhat controversial doctrine, due to its
inherent malleability and its subjective application by courts.53
Nonetheless, fair use is essential to freedom of expression in the
United States, by promoting the use of copyright-protected works in
ways that protect and reward their creators.54
3. The De Minimis Doctrine
Another potential defense to copyright infringement is the de
minimis doctrine. Originating in the Latin maxim de minimis non
curat lex—“the law does not concern itself with trifles”55—the de
minimis doctrine has application in a wide variety of legal settings,
but has been a particularly dynamic aspect of copyright

49

Id.
See More Information on Fair Use, supra note 47.
51
17 U.S.C. § 107.
52
Brogan, supra note 46, at 692–93.
53
See Sonia Katyal et al., Fair Use: Its Application, Limitations and Future,
17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1018 (2007) (arguing that
fair use’s flexibility, which makes it better able to adapt to changing technologies,
also leaves it open to interpretation by widely variant ways). For in-depth
treatment of fair use doctrine in the present day, see DEP’T OF COMMERCE
INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND
STATUTORY DAMAGES (2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications
/white_paper_remixes-first_sale-statutory_damages_jan_2016.pdf.
54
See More Information on Fair Use, supra note 47.
55
Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Application of “De Minimis Non Curat
Lex” to Copyright Infringement Claims, 150 A.L.R. Fed. 661, § 2[a] (1998).
50
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infringement law.56 The applications of the doctrine that are most
relevant in this context are instances where the copying of a musical
sample is so trivial that it cannot be the basis for a legal action.57
However, there are two additional situations where the de minimis
doctrine might either be applied by a court, or invoked by a
defendant: first, when a technical violation of a trivial right occurs;
and second, in a fair use context, in determining the relative size and
substantiality of the copied portion in relation to the entire
copyrighted work.58
The Ciccone ruling makes it likely that the de minimis doctrine
could be an increasingly important aspect of the future legality of
sampling, as the Ninth Circuit relied on the de minimis argument in
ruling that no copyright infringement had taken place.59 Therefore,
Ciccone could potentially signify a de minimis revival.60
Although the Bridgeport court, in mandating that artists must get
a license to sample others’ music,61 created an arbitrary bright-line
rule with respect to de minimis, the question of whether that defense
is applicable is a fact-specific inquiry, due to the nearly infinite ways
artists might choose to copy or sample a work.62 What should not be
up for debate, however, is that the defense be available. This is the
question at the heart of the circuit split created by the Ciccone court:
is the de minimis defense valid against copyright infringement
claims in sound recordings? This Note argues that it unquestionably
is.

56

Id.
See id.
58
Jeremy Scott Sykes, Note, Copyright$The De Minimis Defense in
Copyright Infringement Actions Involving Music Sampling, 36 U. MEM. L. REV.
749, 760 (2006).
59
See VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
60
See Strike a Pose! Madonna Unwittingly Revives De Minimis in Copyright
Law, SEAY FIRM (Nov. 26, 2013), http://theseayfirm.com/strike-a-pose-madonnaunwittingly-revives-de-minimis-in-copyright-law/ [hereinafter Strike a Pose!].
61
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
62
Jennifer R. R. Mueller, Note, All Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v.
Dimension Films and De Minimis Digital Sampling, 81 IND. L.J. 435, 454 (2006).
57
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B. Copyright, Fair Use, and the De Minimis Defense in
Music Sampling

The intersection of fair use, the de minimis doctrine, and
copyright protection with regard to music is complex, and their
application to musical sampling in particular has been volatile,
perhaps somewhat due to musical copyright’s origins in literary
protection.63 Furthermore, musical sampling is an area of the law
where both the fair use and de minimis doctrines play an important
role, but one that has not always been clearly defined.64 The
Supreme Court has referred to a “partial marriage between the
doctrine of fair use and the legal maxim de minimus non curat lex,”65
but has not defined what that relationship should be. The de minimis
defense is also recognized as a crucial tool for determining whether
a license is necessary to sample part of a copyrighted musical
work,66 but this recognition has been upset by the inherent tension
between the Bridgeport and Ciccone rulings. Thus, while both
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized the importance of
fair use and the de minimis defense in copyright law, it is clear that
the law is unsettled in this field.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have struggled to create
and enforce copyright legislation that both respects the rights of
creators and the rights of those who wish to make use of past
creations.67 Below, this Note examines key cases that shaped the
current state of sound recording copyright infringement.

63

See Arewa, supra note 31, at 555–56; see also Michael W. Carroll, The
Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907, 910 (arguing that copyright
has been difficult to apply due to its origins as a solution for book publishers, and
the fact that its expansion has not been straightforward).
64
Vrana, supra note 10, 835–36; see John Scheitinger, Note, Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital
Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 246 (2005).
65
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
66
Scheitinger, supra note 64, at 246.
67
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (asserting
that commercial use of digital sampling in parody songs fell under fair use
protection); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–96 (9th Cir. 2004)
(asserting that use of three notes from composition was de minimis use); Grand
Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
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II. BRIDGEPORT: BEFORE AND AFTER
Prior to Bridgeport, no court had provided a straightforward de
minimis analysis in the sound recordings context.68 For the most
part, federal courts applied a de minimis analysis and made their own
determinations of whether the sampling constituted an actionable
offense.69 Bridgeport abruptly ended that practice within the Sixth
Circuit by setting a bright-line rule that any musical sampling done
without a license constituted copyright infringement.70 Although the
court may have thought that such a rule would streamline music
litigation and create clarity, it actually added chaos and
unpredictability.71 Ciccone presents an alternate approach, and
reflects an opportunity for the courts to achieve greater stability by
reinforcing the de minimis doctrine in sound recording litigation.72
A. Pre-Bridgeport Legal Battles in Digital Sampling
Bridgeport was preceded by several suits that laid the
groundwork for the current circuit split.73 Musical sampling first
became the subject of prominent copyright infringement litigation
in the 1990s, but the practice predates that time period.74 The overt
use of sampling in hip-hop was a key factor that made it a target for

(asserting that digital sampling constituted copyright infringement in all
circumstances).
68
See Grossberg, supra note 5.
69
Scheitinger, supra note 64, at 243.
70
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
71
See Scheitinger, supra note 64, at 246.
72
See Id.; VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016).
73
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994); Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–96 (9th Cir. 2003); Grand Upright Music v.
Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
74
Astride Howell, Sample This! A Ninth Circuit Decision Seems to be in
Harmony with the Sixth Circuit’s Bright-Line Rule on What Constitutes
Infringement in Digital Sampling, 28 L.A. LAWYER 24, 26 (2005) (“Although hip
hop music has been using samples since its origins in the late 1970s, legal
challenges to digital sampling first emerged in the early 1990s.”); see Newton,
388 F.3d at 1192 (asserting that the practice has origins in 1960s Jamaica, when
DJs mixed segments of prior recordings into new mixes, overlaid with vocals).
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lawsuits.75 Rather than applying the traditional doctrines of de
minimis and fair use, courts subjectively applied the criteria for
determining what qualified as a “transformative” use in hop-hop.76
In Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records,77 the first
piece of landmark music sampling litigation, 78 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York bypassed the copyright
infringement analysis altogether, and instead framed its decision in
a way that clearly showcased its contempt for hip-hop in general,
associating the genre on the whole as one of theft.79
In Grand Upright Music, Gilbert O’Sullivan, the copyright
owner, sued rapper Biz Markie for both the use of three words and
a portion of the music from his song “Alone Again (Naturally),” on
the grounds that he had not granted Markie permission to do so.80
The court rejected Markie’s argument that Grand Upright did not
own a valid copyright to the song itself, and compared his conduct
to theft.81 In doing so, the court created the first bright-line rule with
regards to musical sampling: digital sampling without permission
was copyright infringement, and artists who did so could be subject
to criminal penalties.82 However, Grand Upright failed to provide
guidance or advice on how to avoid these stiff repercussions, and
created a chilling effect on musical artists who feared inconsistent
judicial application of copyright infringement standards for musical
sampling.83 The court’s rejection of the culture-based argument that
75

See Arewa, supra note 31, at 552 (asserting that the unmistakable use of
sampling in hip hop challenges the dominant representation of musical authorship
as one that is autonomous, which fails to take into account how much borrowing
goes into musical creation).
76
Id. at 579.
77
Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
78
Id.; see Ryan C. Grelecki, Can Law and Economics Bring the Funk . . . Or
Efficiency?: A Law and Economics Analysis of Digital Sampling, 33 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 297, 305–06 (2005).
79
See Arewa, supra note 31, at 580 (citing Grand Upright Music, 780 F.
Supp. at 183).
80
Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 183–84.
81
Grelecki, supra note 78, at 301, 306.
82
Id. at 306.
83
See Carl A. Falstrom, Note, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music
Ltd. v. Warner Bros Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in
Popular Music, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 367 (1994) (asserting that Grand Upright
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digital sampling is a vibrant addition to the modern musical
landscape, and its accusation that Markie’s sole purpose in sampling
O’Sullivan’s creation was to sell large quantities of albums,
relegated musical sampling to a kind of theft.84 Musical sampling
had been essentially outlawed, and as a result it became much less
commonly practiced.85 Grand Upright brought an end to extensive
sampling and ensured that artists would cease to create albums
composed of many samples due to the risk of litigation.86
While Grand Upright represented a blow to musical artists who
had previously sampled music freely, the doctrine of fair use in
musical copyright infringement received support from the Supreme
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.87 A rap music group known
as 2 Live Crew created a parody of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh,
Pretty Woman.”88 The song was registered for copyright protection
at the time of its creation in 1964, and Acuff-Rose refused to grant
permission to 2 Live Crew to use the song for a parody.89
Nonetheless, 2 Live Crew released the song in various formats, and
were sued nearly one year later by Acuff-Rose.90 In its decision, the
Sixth Circuit held that the “blatantly commercial purpose” of the
song prevented the parody from being a fair use.91 This was similar
created a more hostile climate for artists who wished to sample music); Chris
Johnstone, Note, Underground Appeal: A Sample of the Chronic Questions in
Copyright Law Pertaining to the Transformative Use of Digital Music in a Civil
Society, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 407 (2004) (noting that Grand Upright increased
self-policing of sampling in the music industry out of fear of litigation).
84
See Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
85
See Chris Richards, The Court Case That Changed Hip-Hop$From
Public Enemy to Kanye$Forever, WASH. POST (July 6, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-court-case-that-changed-hip-hop-from-public-enemy-to-kanye--forever/2012/07/06/gJQAVWr0RW_story.html?
utm_term=.dec92d179345.
86
See Damon Krukowski, Plagiarize This: A Reasonable Solution to
Musical Copyright After Blurred Lines, PITCHFORK (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://pitchfork.com/features/oped/9613-plagiarize-this-a-reasonable-solutionto-musical-copyright-after-blurred-lines/.
87
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 572–73.
90
Id. at 573.
91
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992).
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to the Grand Upright decision in that the court considered the
commercial profitability of a song in determining whether it
constituted an instance of copyright infringement.92 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a commercial parody
song might fall under the protection of the fair use doctrine, and
concluded unanimously that it could.93 The Court presented a
thorough fair use analysis, breaking from the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
by noting that a work’s commercial character is but one element in
analyzing fair use, and ultimately remanded the case on two out of
the four fair use factors.94 The case never proceeded to that point,
however, as the parties settled out of court and came to a licensing
agreement that abruptly ended the litigation.95 Campbell is now
recognized as a landmark case in copyright law with regard to fair
use in parody songs, due to the broad protection from copyright
infringement claims it afforded musical artists.96
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit handed down a pro-de minimis
decision in Newton v. Diamond, and a circuit split began to take
form.97 The case arose when the hip-hop group Beastie Boys
sampled a six-second, three-note segment, of a composition by jazz
flutist James W. Newton.98 Although the group had obtained a
license to sample a copyrighted recorded performance, they had not
obtained a license for the underlying composition, which was also
copyrighted.99 The Ninth Circuit held that the use of the composition
was de minimis and therefore not actionable.100 Newton represented
the first time an appellate court had ruled on the applicability of the
de minimis defense to cases of copyright infringement in music
92

See id. at 1436–37 (1992); Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros., 780 F.
Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
93
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–81, 590–94.
94
Thomas Irvin, “If That’s the Way It Must Be, O*ay:” Campbell v. AcuffRose on Rewind, 36 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 137, 139–41 (2016) (arguing that
Campbell was an unlikely and ironic savior, as the song was not actually a
parody).
95
See id. at 140.
96
See id. at 137–38.
97
Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.2003).
98
Id. at 592.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 594.
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sampling.101 The court conducted an in-depth analysis of the
compositional elements of the sample, the scope of the copying, and
the substantiality of the use, as well as the court’s own 1986 ruling
in Fisher v. Dees, which observed that “a use is de minimis only if
the average audience would not recognize the appropriation.”102
However, Newton represented only a limited victory for digital
samplers.103 While the decision did reflect a firm acceptance of the
de minimis defense in the context of musical sampling, it was silent
on de minimis exceptions for sampling sound recordings.104 That
question would be addressed one year later by the Sixth Circuit in
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films.105
B. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films
In 2001, Bridgeport Music (“Bridgeport”) and Westbound
Records (“Westbound”) alleged almost five hundred instances of
copyright infringement against roughly eight hundred defendants.106
Bridgeport owned the musical composition copyright and
Westbound owned the sound recording copyright for George
Clinton’s song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” a two-second portion
of which was sampled by the rap group NWA in their song “100
Miles and Runnin.”107 Westbound appealed the district court’s
decision to grant summary judgment to the song’s copyright holder,

101
102

1986)).
103

See Sykes, supra note 58, at 764.
Newton, 349 F.3d at 594–96 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.

See Michael Suppola, Confusion in the Digital Age: Why the De Minimis
Use Test Should Be Applied to Digital Samples of Copyrighted Sound Recordings,
14 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 93, 111 (2006).
104
See id. at 112.
105
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798–800 (6th Cir.
2005).
106
Id. The court interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) to mean that artists may
imitate portions of music, but cannot use the actual recordings themselves. Id. at
800.
107
Id. at 795–96; see B.J. Steiner, Today in Hip-Hop: N.W.A. Drops “100
Miles and Runnin” EP, XXL MAG (Aug. 14, 1990), http://www.xxlmag.com/ne
ws/hip-hop-today/2015/08/today-in-hip-hop-n-w-a-releases-100-miles-runninep/.
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Dimension Films, claiming that the use of the sample was de
minimis.108
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the infringement claim, issuing a new maxim for digital
samplers% “Get a license or do not sample.”109 The court echoed the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Campbell that 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), the
subsection of the Copyright Act that lays out the scope of exclusive
rights in sound recordings, justified the creation of a bright-line rule
that dispensed with the de minimis analysis altogether, stating that it
was unnecessary in instances where the defendant did not dispute
sampling a sound recording without a license.110 Bridgeport and
Newton do not together constitute a circuit split, as each holding
confined itself to one portion of the sampling-as-copyrightinfringement equation.111 However, the vast chasm between the de
minimis rationales employed in their conclusions demonstrated the
potential for deep schisms between courts in the future on this issue,
which have indeed come to fruition after Ciccone.112
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport was unduly harsh,
and the court should not have overlooked the creative and cultural
value of sampling in general.113 By refusing to acknowledge that
sampling is a form of creative composition, the court dramatically
108

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
Id. at 801–05.
110
Id. at 798.
111
See generally Tracy L. Reilley, Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital
Sampling: An Endorsement of the Bridgeport Music Court’s Attempt to Afford
“Sound” Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
355, 370 (2008) (explaining that the Newton court limited its opinion to an
analysis of composition use, whereas the Bridgeport court limited itself to sound
recording copyrights). See contra John S. Pelletier, Note, Sampling the Circuits:
The Case for a New Comprehensive Scheme for Determining Copyright
Infringement as a Result of Music Sampling, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1161, 1183
(2012) (referring to a virtual circuit split as a result of these holdings).
112
See Pelletier, supra note 110, at 1187–88 (outlining the issues with the
application of the de minimis doctrine in both Bridgeport and Newton).
113
Lauren Fontein Brandes, From Mozart to Hip-Hop: The Impact of
Bridgeport v. Dimension Films on Musical Creativity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93,
95, 121–22 (2007); Joshua Crum, The Day the (Digital) Music Died: Bridgeport,
Sampling Infringement, and a Proposed Middle Ground, 2008 BYU L. REV. 943,
961–64.
109
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limited a key form of artistic expression.114 Indeed, Bridgeport had
an immediate chilling effect on digital sampling.115 Some district
courts have relied on language from Bridgeport, such as the
Southern District of New York, which stated as recently as 2015 that
“[b]revity does not preclude copyright protection.”116 However,
many district courts outside of the Sixth Circuit have declined to
follow Bridgeport, and even rebuked it in their decisions.117 While
the Sixth Circuit’s command to either get a license to sample or
refrain from sampling altogether has not created lasting precedent in
courts outside its borders, it stood as the principal authority on the
de minimis doctrine in sampling until 2016.118
C. VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Ciccone was a landmark decision
in musical copyright infringement litigation.119 The court broadly
attacked the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Bridgeport, and purposely
created a circuit split that underscored the unsettled nature of music
sampling liability.120 This has created two wildly divergent
treatments of the de minimis doctrine across two circuits that handle
a high volume of musical sampling litigation, which will likely
result in vastly different bodies of case law and an increased
likelihood that parties to copyright infringement lawsuits will
engage in forum shopping.121 The problems and uncertainty posed

114

See Brandes, supra note 113, at 121–22.
KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW
AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 114 (1st ed. 2011).
116
Fischer v. Forrest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4395, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
117
See VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016).
118
See Grossberg, supra note 5.
119
See Bill Donaghue, The Top 10 Copyright Rulings of 2016, LAW360
(Dec. 21, 2016) https://www.law360.com/articles/874934/the-top-10-copyrightrulings-of-2016.
120
Mark Wittow & Eliza Hall, Ninth Circuit and High German Court Weigh
In On Music Sampling, LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.law360.com
/articles/824098/9th-circ-and-german-high-court-weigh-in-on-music-sampling.
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See id.
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by this circuit split show that a clarifying ruling on music sampling
is ripe for a Supreme Court determination.122
1. Ciccone–a Direct Challenge to Bridgeport
Similar to Grand Upright, Campbell, Newton, and Bridgeport,
the chief issue in Ciccone was a musical sample.123 VMG Salsoul,
the owner of Salsoul Records and copyright holder of many of the
label’s releases, alleged that in 1990, Madonna’s producer had
copied a .23-second horn hit from a song it held copyright to called
“Love Break,” modified it, and used it in “#ogue” without
permission.124 The horn hit appeared in two forms% a “single” hit of
a quarter-note chord and a “double” hit of an eighth-note chord,
followed by a quarter-note chord of the same notes.125 VMG Salsoul
argued that this constituted copyright infringement of both the
composition and the sound recording. There was no dispute that
actual copying occurred, but the parties contested whether the
copying constituted an infringement.126
Madonna prevailed in the district court, which allowed that a de
minimis sample would not constitute infringement, and that even if
actual copying had been proven, the claim would fail due to its
triviality.127 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment,
breaking with the reasoning in Bridgeport and reaffirming that there
is no basis to assume an exception to the de minimis defense in sound
recording.128 The court held that the copied sound recording was
virtually unidentifiable, as not even an expert could identify the horn
hit as being from another song.129 Therefore, the court found that a
reasonable jury could not conclude that an average audience would
recognize the sample as being from “Love Break,” and the fact that
a highly qualified expert could not identify the source of the horn
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. at 876–77.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 878–81.
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justified a ruling that its use was de minimis.130 The court argued
strenuously in favor of the availability of the de minimis defense in
copyright infringement litigation, directly attacking Bridgeport’s
holding as having no grounding in legislative history.131 The court
relied on the leading copyright treatise in its defense of the de
minimis exception,132 as well as 17 U.S.C. § 106, noting that nothing
in its text suggested that the exception should be any less available
than in other types of copyright infringement claims.133 Finally, the
court dispensed with #MG Salsoul’s argument that the third
sentence of § 114(b) somehow carved out an exception for sound
recordings, and declined to find an implicit expansion of rights in a
statement expressly limiting them.134 This decision was directly at
odds with the Bridgeport rule, and created a circuit split between
two jurisdictions with large caseloads of music industry litigation.135
2. Potential Implications and Outcomes
Ciccone could make an impact in the courts and the music
industry more broadly in several ways.136 It seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would support the Bridgeport rule if it heard a
musical copyright infringement litigation case.137 The classic issue

130

Id. at 880.
Id. at 878–82.
132
Id. at 880–81.
133
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); Ciccone, 824 F.3d. at 881–82.
134
Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 882–83 (“The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”).
135
Wittow & Hall, supra note 120.
136
See infra Section II.C.2; see also Wittow & Hall, supra note 120 (“A
Supreme Court decision recognizing the de minimis rule with respect to sound
recording sampling would provide musicians and music producers somewhat
greater freedom to creatively sample other works, to a limit degree, but would not
eliminate the current legal requirement for a sampler to get a license for any
recognizable or substantial sample.”).
137
See Mike Mireles, Is Music Sampling Back in Vogue?, MUSIC LAW
UPDATES (June 3, 2016), http://musiclawupdates.blogspot.com/2016/06/is131
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of whether a bright-line rule is preferable to uncertainty might be
one factor for the Court to consider, and perhaps it would find in
favor of the Bridgeport rule on those grounds, but ultimately it
seems more likely that the Court would find the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Ciccone more persuasive.138 The Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning was steeped in legislative history, and the court had the
advantage that it could point to ten years of case law that declined
to follow Bridgeport, which demonstrates a lack of support for its
holding.139 If a musical copyright infringement case reaches the
Supreme Court, it could either follow Bridgeport’s reasoning and
declare that all sampling requires a license, or follow Ciccone’s
reasoning favoring the availability of a de minimis defense.140 This
Note proposes that the Supreme Court should do the latter, and
resolve the current uncertainty in music sampling law in favor of
creative license.
III. A FOUR-PART SOLUTION
The Supreme Court and Congress should take action to clarify
copyright infringement law and legislation. First, a ruling from the
Supreme Court resolving the Ciccone/Bridgeport split is necessary
to end confusion in this area of the law.141 The Supreme Court
should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Ciccone recognizing
the de minimis defense to copyright infringement. The Court must
recognize the realities of musical creation to ensure that copyright
music-sampling-back-in-vogue.html (suggesting that the “solid analysis” of the
Ninth Circuit is more likely to prevail); Wittow & Hall, supra note 120.
138
See Mireles, supra note 137 (“The Ninth Circuit position arguably creates
uncertainty, but if Congress did not intend special rules for sampling sound
recordings and the musical genres that rely on sampling, then maybe we shouldn’t
have them.”); Editorial, Appeals Court Cuts Music Samplers Some Slack, L.A.
TIMES (June 7, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-musiccopyrights-20160606-snap-story.html [hereinafter Editorial, Appeals Court]
(arguing the Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning because
a bright-line rule gives copyright holders too much control over every sound that
goes into their work).
139
VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881–84 (9th Cir. 2016).
140
Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 874; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
141
Grossberg, supra note 5; Wittow & Hall, supra note 120.
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law keeps pace with musical innovation.142 A ruling from the
Supreme Court strengthening the de minimis defense and refuting
Bridgeport would protect creators and artists without infringing on
the rights of copyright holders.143
Second, Congress should reaffirm the fair use doctrine to resolve
uncertainty in copyright infringement litigation. The fair use defense
is too uncertain as it currently stands, and Congress should expand
the four-factor test and clarify the boundary lines of fair use, while
maintaining its crucial flexibility.144 Third, Congress should also
implement a compulsory mechanical license scheme, by which
means copyright owners would license the use of their rights against
payment either set by law or determined by contract.145
Alternatively, Congress might instead create a sample-based
copyright management system that would enable copyright holders
to regulate and accept payment for access to their intellectual
property.146 Finally, Congress should further expand upon these
potential solutions by creating an administrative agency to oversee
their implementation. These actions would be a positive step
forward for copyright infringement law, and would provide clarity

142

Editorial, Appeals Court, supra note 138.
See Julie D. Cromer, Harry Potter and the Three-Second Crime: Are We
Vanishing the De Minimis Defense from Copyright Law?, 36 N.M. L. REV. 263
(2006).
144
See generally Vrana, supra note 10, at 832–33 (explaining that the fairuse doctrine is “meant to be flexible” and listing the four factors of the fair-use
analysis).
145
See id. at 850–55; Krukowski, supra note 86 (supporting the concept of
compulsory mechanical licensing as a reasonable solution in the current high-risk
musical copyright infringement landscape). See generally Heather McDonald,
What You Should Know About Compulsory Mechanical Licenses, BALANCE (Oct.
14, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/what-you-should-know-about-compuls
ory-mechanical-licenses-2460917 (explaining the basics of a compulsory
mechanical license).
146
See Drew B. Hollander, “Why Can’t We Be Friends?”: How Congress
Can Work With the Private Sector to Solve the Digital Sampling Conundrum, 18
VA. J.L. & TECH. 229, 250–52 (2014).
143
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and guidance to an area of the law that is currently very risky for
musical artists.147
A. Part One: Strengthen De Minimis
Ciccone has set up an excellent opportunity for the Supreme
Court to resolve a circuit split on the issue of whether musical
sampling can ever be de minimis.148 In Ciccone, the Ninth Circuit
repudiated the Sixth Circuit’s declaration that all musical sampling
required a license.149 The Supreme Court should follow this
reasoning and reaffirm the viability of the de minimis exception.150
The de minimis doctrine has been a longstanding feature of
copyright law.151 Courts have long recognized the utility of the
doctrine, as it prevents the judiciary from becoming clogged with
cases of little import.152 Furthermore, it recognizes that an act of
copying frequently does not directly translate to an act of economic
harm.153 Overly restrictive copyright legislation has a stifling effect
147

See Stan Soocher, A Look at the Post-‘Vogue’ De Minimis World, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Dec. 6, 2016), www.insidecounsel.com/2016/12/06/a-look-at-thepost-vogue-de-minmis-world?page=2&slreturn=1488159512.
148
VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016); Tamany
Vinson Bentz & Matthew J. Busch, VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Madonna Louise
Ciccone, et al.: Why a Bright Line Infringement Rule for Sound Recordings is no
Longer in Vogue, VENEABLE LLP: PUBLICATIONS (June 28, 2016),
https://www.venable.com/vmg-salsoul-llc-v-madonna-louise-ciccone-et-al-whya-bright-line-infringement-rule-for-sound-recordings-is-no-longer-in-vogue-0628-2016/.
149
Ciccone, 824 F.3d at 874–75.
150
Id. at 885–87.
151
The earliest instance of a possible de minimis defense dates from the midnineteenth century. Cromer, supra note 145, at 265 (“Application of the de
minimis doctrine has even longer roots in copyright law. The first published
copyright decision incorporating the maxim emerged in 1847, finding that a
“trifling” novelty in the arrangement of entries in a dictionary of flowers was not
sufficient to garner copyright protection. The circuit court noted, ‘Some
similarities, and some use of prior works, even to copying of small parts, are in
such cases tolerated, if the main design and execution are in reality novel or
improved, and not a mere cover for important piracies from others.” (citations
omitted)).
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See id. at 288.
153
Id. at 289.
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on innovation and is a threat to the Constitution’s inherent promise
to promote science and the arts, and the potential economic harm
caused by small amounts of copying is an invisible threat by
comparison.154 The time has never been better for a strengthening of
de minimis, now that songs can be parsed for their composite
samples on a microscopic level that was previously unimaginable.155
While the rule that every sample requires a license may seem
straightforward to enforce, in a world where every split-second of
music can be itemized to its core, it is too burdensome.156
If the Supreme Court declines to resolve the Ciccone/Bridgeport
split, or does not have the opportunity to do so, Congress should
independently act, rather than allow divergent interpretations of the
de minimis doctrine to create two vastly different bodies of
copyright case law.157 While Congress did not act in response to the
Bridgeport ruling, that case alone did not create the split that now
exists.158 The 1976 overhaul of the Copyright Act “clearly intended
154

See generally Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and Mashing . . . Oh
My! How Hip Hop Music is Scratching More Than the Surface of Copyright Law,
21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 843 (2011) (advocating that the
Constitution’s promise to promote creativity and innovation would be better
served by less restrictive legislation, particularly in hip hop because producers
have always relied on the innovative use of existing recordings to create
completely new works, without fear of legal action).
155
See Michael Rancic, Why a Canadian Composer’s Controversial 80s
Work is Still Ahead of Today’s Copyright Laws, THUMP (July 13, 2016),
https://thump.vice.com/en_us/article/john-oswald-copyright-interview
(“The
website WhoSampled indexes not only samples, but remixes and
interpolations . . . ”).
156
Id.
157
Donaghue, supra note 119. VMG Salsoul has declined to appeal the case,
and there is not currently a petition before the Supreme Court on this particular
issue.
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Schmeiser et al., Law Alert–’De Minimis’ Exception for Copyright
Infringement of Sound Recordings, SCHMEISER OLSEN & WATTS LLP (June 8,
2016), http://www.iplawusa.com/law-alert-de-minimis-exception-for-copyrightinfringement-of-sound-recordings/ (“[B]ecause Congress has not amended the
copyright statute in response to Bridgeport, the court should conclude
that Bridgeport correctly interpreted congressional intent . . . The court stated
that the Supreme Court has held that congressional inaction in the face of a judicial
statutory interpretation, even with respect to the Supreme Court’s own decisions
affecting the entire nation, carries almost no weight, and rejected the argument.”).
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for the de minimis rule to apply to all sound recordings,” and
Congress should act now to reaffirm that intent.159
B. Part Two: Reaffirm Fair Use
The second component of a proposed solution involves
affirming the vital role that fair use plays in copyright law.160 Fair
use must continue to be a valid defense for artists whose use of
others’ works in their own output passes the current four-factor
test.161 However, fair use should be a less expensive means of
defense.162 Redesigning the doctrine of fair use “to allow unfettered
access for transformative uses” has often been suggested as one
solution to the murky problems of copyright infringement in sound
recording.163 This includes calls for the doctrine to be changed so
that the transformative use of protected works would no longer
require securing a license.164 This new, transformative inquiry might
actually include something of a bright-line item in the form of an
explicit limit on how long a sample could be.165
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There are valid reasons to resist expanding the fair use doctrine.
First, apart from the fact that there is currently no sustained call to
dramatically redefine fair use, such as there is for an overhaul of
copyright infringement law, it is likely that this would only provide
courts more opportunities to hand down subjective and
contradictory rulings, clarifying nothing.166 Second, courts must be
careful to balance competing interests: a wholesale expansion of fair
use would result in the loss of critical protections for creators, while
a policy of more stringent fair use protections would stifle
creators.167 However, these concerns overlook that fair use is a
flexible doctrine, and could likely be molded into something very
similar to its current state, but with additional features to make it a
better fit for the current needs of copyright law.168 For example,
digital sampling’s effect on sales of copyrighted songs can actually
be quite positive, but there is no current allowance for this type of
market effect in current fair use analysis.169
Another way that either Congress or the Supreme Court should
bring fair use into the twenty-first century would be via the addition
of an ownership clause whereby a recipient would retain ownership
of any work without any original material.170 The adoption of a
model based on best practices for fair use model, put forth by the
Center for Media & Social Impact, is another way that fair use could
be reaffirmed.171 The fair use doctrine is unlikely to be challenged
166
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in the Supreme Court anytime soon, as it is central to freedom of
speech and expression.172 Furthermore, the protections affirmed in
the Campbell decision are robust and have been followed by
widespread recognition of the critical role that First Amendment
rights play in copyright law.173 Still, a successful answer to
copyright law’s problems in this realm should necessarily reaffirm
fair use and adapt the doctrine to fit seamlessly in modern times.174
C. Part Three: Implement A Licensing System
In addition to doctrinal changes to de minimis and fair use, a
system for licensing the use of copyrighted works apart from
existing schema would be an effective step towards reducing the
high volume of litigation and uncertainty with regard to musical
sampling.175 In the current environment of high-risk litigation, such
a system would allow artists to copy or borrow intellectual property
and use it in their own work on the condition that they paid the
owner a royalty fee, while neutralizing the threat of expensive court
battles.176
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U. PA. L. REV. 441, 505 n.332 (2016) (“Copyright legislation that restricts an
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under the First Amendment.” (quoting C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits
on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 951 (2002))).
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There have been several proposals for a new licensing system
that would modernize copyright law and adapt it so it shared some
of the same features of the current licensing system for cover
songs.177 There are also calls for the creation of a secondary marketas-licensing-system, and rewards to be reaped by both creators and
rights holders.178 Courts might be enticed to embrace these kinds of
revised frameworks, as they would remove difficult and timeconsuming fair use determinations from their dockets.179 However,
critical to the success of this kind of endeavor would be ensuring
that the license-pricing model was fair to both extremely successful
musical artists as well as smaller, independent creators.180 The
current licensing system in place involves a complex rate-setting
process.181 This system, adjudicated by the Copyright Royalty
Board and involving a large cast of interested parties, determines the
rates and terms for making and distributing music under compulsory
licenses.182 While it might be difficult to implement such a system
on a larger scale with greater applicability, this legislative process
177
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“while copyright does not distinguish between copying major and minor talents,
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sampled artist and the success of the sampled song”). See generally DANA A.
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of negotiation would arguably be preferable to the environment of
high-risk litigation that currently dominates copyright infringement
in musical sampling.183
In early 2016, the Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy
Task Force published a white paper which essentially eliminated the
idea of creating either a new exception or a compulsory license
system anytime in the near future.184 While the landscape of
copyright infringement case law with regard to musical sampling
has changed in the past year,185 the Department of Commerce’s
paper suggests that there is currently no momentum to implement
reform.186 However, while it is difficult to predict how the landscape
of copyright law might change in the next few years, there are sure
to be renewed calls for reform.187 Congress should heed those calls
and implement an appropriate licensing system that would
modernize copyright infringement law, in line with strengthening
the fair use and de minimis doctrines.
D. Part Four: Create an Administrative Agency
The creation of an administrative agency would be a positive
step forward for copyright law.188 This could take several forms; for
183
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example, if Congress opted to create a new licensing scheme, an
administrative agency overseeing the scheme would be helpful to
ensure compliance.189 Alternatively, Congress might create an
agency tasked with making fair use determinations.190 Professor
Michael Carroll, for example, has proposed the creation of a Fair
Use Board within the Copyright Office that would declare whether
the use of a work falls under fair use.191 The effect of its rulings
would be similar to a no-action letter from the Securities and
Exchange Commission or a ruling from the Internal Revenue
Service.192 Another agency-based proposal, by Professor Jason
Mazzone, suggests that an administrative agency should either
create regulations determining what constitutes fair use and attempt
to prevent infringements of those regulations, or issue regulations
and determine whether a use constitutes fair use prior to litigation.193
Mazzone argues that agency regulation would protect free speech,
restore uniformity to fair use evaluations, and promote the fair use
of copyrighted works.194 While these and similar proposals have
been characterized as being oblivious to reality, they provide a
valuable framework for how Congress should act.195 These
proposals would help to remove some of the uncertainty from
musical copyright infringement litigation, providing guidance to
artists and setting clear boundaries for what would constitute legal
sampling.
fact, the contemporary debate over how best to reconcile the some times
conflicting goals of copyright regulation is really a modern rendition of a
centuries-old argument.”).
189
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The creation of an administrative agency would not detract from
either the fair use or de minimis doctrines, and in fact an
administrative agency could effectively operate alongside them.196
As Professor Oren Bracha has asserted, there is no reason why there
must be an exclusive reliance upon either fair use doctrine or a
statutory scheme for resolving potential copyright infringement
claims.197 A combination of strict rules and open-ended standards is
ideal for copyright law in general, and a hybrid regime would make
sense for sound recording as well as digitization.198
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Ciccone may have marked a
significant turning point for digital sampling in copyright law.199 By
ruling that minor sampling may qualify as de minimis use, the Ninth
Circuit signaled that it was willing to break with the Sixth Circuit’s
Bridgeport decision and deliberately create a circuit split.200 If the
Supreme Court has the opportunity to resolve this split, it should
look to the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive reasoning, supported by
legislative history and public policy concerns, and find that there is
no exception for the use of the de minimis defense in sound
recordings.201
The joint four-part solution outlined above combines elements
of practicality, fairness, expediency, and flexibility in a way that
should both facilitate creation of new musical compositions and
protect creators from copyright infringement. Even if only some of
these components are put into action, it will represent an important
advancement in the realm of sound recording in copyright
196
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infringement. While it is tempting to apply a bright-line rule to this
complex situation, the complexities and issues inherent in copyright
law today—not unlike issues in the past—reject such a solution, just
as courts have rejected the proposed rule in Bridgeport.202 An ideal
solution would be one that strengthened de minimis doctrine,
reaffirmed fair use, established a licensing system, and created an
administering body to oversee it. Congress and the courts should
take these steps to bring copyright infringement law into the twentyfirst century.

202

Id.

